and that it should be "separated" from substainable development "to ensure that human activity does not surpass the planet's limited resources".
23
Philippe Sands also noted the distinction between the substantive nature of economic, social and cultural rights in setting environmental standards, and the procedural nature of civil and political rights in providing (inter alia) for information rights and "access to judicial or administrative remedies". 24 He observed that "economic and social rights have traditionally been less well developed in practice", 25 but noted the creative approach by the courts to enforce "substantive environmental rights".
26
For example, the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (ECHR) imposes a positive obligation on states in the context of the right to life (art 2) to provide an "effective system" of regulating, supervising and controlling the adverse effects of "inherently dangerous" activities that pose a risk to human life, such as "toxic emissions" from industrial activities, or the management of "waste disposal sites". 27 However, art 21 Glazebrook (n 17) 95. 22 Glazebrook (n 17) 95. were not given access to environmental information concerning a proposed chemical factory in a timely way. 28 In contrast, complaints regarding noise from night flights at Heathrow Airport were not upheld. 29 In those cases, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights focused on whether the activities were lawful, whether there was any non-compliance with regulations, whether the proposed activity had been "tested" and found to be "compatible" with statutory requirements, and whether the activities were in the "interests" of the national economy. 30 The Court declined to "accord" any "special status"
to environmental rights, and focused on the need for proof of:
31
… the existence of a harmful effect on a person's private or family sphere and not simply on the general deterioration of the environment.
Overall, these cases demonstrate that the Court will have "regard to the balance of competing interests" when deciding whether the relevant regulatory authorities "have overstepped their margin of appreciation" that affords a degree of pragmatic deference to the need for efficient regulation in the modern state. The European Court of Human Rights has also considered nuisance complaints "caused by adjacent commercial activity" in the context of the protection of property under art 1 of the First Protocol to the ECHR, 43 that guarantees "peaceful enjoyment" of property and safeguards against compulsory acquisition otherwise than in accordance with due process, subject to the general ability of the state to regulate in the public interest. While the Court has held that land use controls imposed under planning restrictions "constitute measures of control on the use of property" caught by art 1, 44 it has nevertheless found such controls to be "permissible" when imposed by regulations that are demonstrated to be necessary and in the public interest.
45
Generally, art 1 requires that "a fair balance" should be struck "between the individual interest and the general interest", 46 which
implies "a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim pursued" while affording "a wide margin of appreciation" for the state in terms of selecting regulatory methods. 47 The New Zealand courts have adopted a similar approach when balancing the rights affirmed and protected by the NZBORA.
48
Beyond that, there is a strong New Zealand tradition of neo-liberal academic literature based on the US takings doctrine advocating for the constitutional recognition of property rights. 49 These arguments have not found traction with the courts, 50 but this appears to be more of a reaction against neo-liberal theory than an unwillingness to apply 43 Ovey and White (n 27) 284. Beyond that, Epstein also noted that while land use restrictions can "disrupt" and "distort" the market, regulators will not be immune from public opinion "as their inefficiencies can lead to political backlash". legal personaility, with persons being appointed to speak on their behalf.
74

IV CULTURAL RIGHTS
This section analyses the role of cultural rights, for example, kaitiakitanga or the exercise of guardianship by Maori in accordance
with customary values and practices in relation to natural and physical resources, in promoting sustainable management.
Rule of law for nature
Whata noted the strong ecological approach in New Zealand environmental law writing that "maintains" the normative value of sustainable management as an "ethic" that "should guide our actions" in a similar way to the influence of the concept of justice on the law generally. Beyond that, Whata also considered that kaitiakitanga has a common law dimension. This is a significant common law development, particularly when read together with the environmental rights in art 105 of the proposed written constitution for New Zealand.
112
Common laws of the environment
From a New Zealand perspective, Sian Elias placed environmental law in its wider legal context, in particular its role as "a branch of administrative law". 113 Recognising the need for the law to balance
Expressing some "sympathy" for the suggestion "that the judiciary
should not be placed in the position of having to determine values or policy", 116 she noted that there are critical differences between human rights adjudication and environmental conflict resolution, as human rights are expressed in qualified terms that are underpinned by a sound theoretical basis and both "international and comparative jurisprudence":
117
By contrast, environmental conflict is intrinsically much more difficult to resolve if the ends in view are not ordered in any way that provides a handle for decision-makers, as by setting minimum standards which do confer rights of enforcement. At-large judicial balancing may be at best unconvincing and at the worst may mask political judgments which cannot be adequately justified by reference to legal standards and which should be directly taken by those who are politically accountable.
Previously, Elias emphasized the need for "organizing principles" while noting the inherent constraints of the common law in developing "statements of over-arching principle" from the mass of case law generated by pragmatic and sporadic litigation. She also noted the 114 Elias (n 113) 2-3, referring to Robin Cooke "Forward" in Kenneth Palmer Planning and Development Law in New Zealand (2nd ed, Law Book Company, Sydney, 1984 Overall, rights based approaches arguably provide "a more focused, consistent and transparent methodology". 129 
